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We have experience and are conscious of the world. Who though is conscious? This is the subject or self of
experience. While in the past the concept of self has been matter of philosophical discussion, psychoanalysis shifted
it into the domain of psychology where it surfaced as ego. More recently, brain imaging allows to investigate the
neural mechanisms underlying our subjective experience of a self. The article focuses on discussing different
concepts of self as based on the philosophical accounts. These are then complemented by neuroscientific data on
self and self-reference. Finally both philosophical and neuroscientific accounts are directly compared with each
other while at the same time their relevance for psychoanalysis of self and ego are pointed out.Introduction: concept of self
You read these lines. You find them boring and your ex-
perience is thus signified by boredom. Who experiences
this boredom? You. You are the subject of the experi-
ence of boredom. Without you as subject of this experi-
ence, you could not experience anything at all, not even
boredom. This subject of experience has been described
as the ‘self ’. It is your ‘self ’ that makes it possible for you
to experience things. The self is a necessary condition
for the possible constitution of experience and thus also
consciousness. It is clear therefore that there is much at
stake when it comes to the self. We thus need to discuss
how to characterize and define the concept of self. Why
is the self so important? Because we usually assume that
somebody must have consciousness. Somebody speaks
a language. And somebody acquires a second language
when coming for instance to a new country. Without
somebody we may remain unable to do all these things.
Who though is this somebody? This is what is traditio-
nally called self. Hence the self is of central relevance.
Who though is this self? This is the topic of the present
contribution. In what follows, I will outline 4 ways of
conceptualising the self; the mental self, the empirical
self, the phenomenal self and the minimal self. I will
then consider how the self can and has been researched
experiementally in respect to the brain before conclu-
ding with a discussion on the concept of self and its rela-
tion to identity and the environment.Correspondence: Georg.Northoff@theroyal.ca
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This section introduces four different concepts of self.
The mental self is supposed to be based on our thoughts
and a specific mental substance. This is different in the
concept of the empirical self. Here the self is assumed to
be no longer based on a mental substance but rather on
representing and reflecting about the biological pro-
cesses in the own body and brain. Another concept of
self, the phenomenal self, starts from what we can ex-
perience in our consciousness. In addition to the content
like this book in front of me, consciousness comes with an
awareness of the own self, pre-reflective self-awareness or
phenomenal self. Finally, most recently philosophers speak
of a minimal self that is supposed to be based on our body
and its physiological processes.Concept of self: mental self
What is the self? What must it look like in order to pre-
suppose experience and be the subject of our experi-
ence? The nature of the self has often been determined
as a specific ‘thing’. Stones are things, the table on which
your laptop stands is a thing. And in the same way the
table makes it possible for the laptop to stand on, the
self may be a thing that makes experience and cons-
ciousness possible. In other words, these, metaphorically
speaking, stand on the shoulders of the self. However,
another question is whether the self is a thing or, as phi-
losophers such as Rene Descartes suggest, a substance?
A substance is a specific stuff, entity or material that is
supposed to serve as basis for something like a self.
For instance the body can be traced back to a physicalThis is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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e.g., mental substance.
Is our self real and thus exists? Or is it just an illusion?
Let’s compare the situation to perception. When we per-
ceive something in our environment, we sometimes per-
ceive not a real thing but an illusion which in reality
does not exist. What though exists and is real? This is
what philosophers call a metaphysical question, the one
for existence and reality. Earlier philosophers like Rene
Descartes assumed that the self is real and exists. How-
ever, he also assumed that the self is different from the
body. Hence self and body exists but differ in their exist-
ence and reality. The self can thus be not a physical sub-
stance but rather a mental substance: It is a feature not
of the body but of the mind and thus a mental entity ra-
ther than physical substance.
However, the characterization of the self as mental
entity has been doubted. For example, the Scottish phi-
losopher David Hume argued that there is no self as a
mental entity. All there is is a complex set or ‘bundle’ of
perceptions of interrelated events that reflect the world
in its entirety. There is no additional self in the world;
instead there is nothing but the events we perceive.
Everything else, such as the assumption of a self as men-
tal entity, is nothing but an illusion. The self as mental
entity and thus as mental substance does not exist and is
therefore not real.
The rejection of the self as mental substance and its
outing as mere illusion is also currently popular. One
major proponent of such view these days is the German
philosopher Thomas Metzinger [1]. In a nutshell, he ar-
gues that through our experience, we develop models of
the self, so-called ‘self-models’. These self-models are
nothing but information processes in our brain. How-
ever, since we do not have direct access to these neur-
onal processes (e.g., all those processes and activities of
the cells, neurons, in the brain) in our brain as neuronal
processes, we tend to assume an entity that must under-
lie our own self-model. This entity is then characterized
as self.
Following Metzinger, the assumption of the self as a
mental entity results from a false positive and thus er-
roneous inference from our experience. We cannot ex-
perience the neuronal processes in our brain as such.
Nobody ever experienced on-line his own brain as such
and its neuronal processes. The outcome of our brain’s
neuronal processes, the self, cannot then no longer be
traced back to its original basis, the brain, in our experi-
ence. Where though does the self come from? We as-
sume that it must be traced back to a special instance
different from the brain. This leads us to assume a mind
and the self as mental entity rather than as physical en-
tity coming from the brain itself. Metzinger now argues
that any such self as mental entity does simply not exist.Therefore, Metzinger [1] concludes, selves do not exist
and can therefore be eliminated. Hence, the title of his
book ‘Being no one’.
Concept of self: from the metaphysical to the empirical
self
What then is the self if not a mental entity? Current
authors, such as Metzinger [1] and Churchland [2], ar-
gue that the self as mental substance or entity does not
exist. How though do we come up with the idea of a self
or the self-model as Metzinger says? The model of our
own self is based on summarizing, integrating, and co-
ordinating all the information from our own body and
own brain. Take all that information together, coordinate
and integrate it, and then you have a self-model of your
own brain and body and their respective processes.
In more technical terms, our own brain and body are
represented as such in the neuronal activity of the brain.
And such representation is the model of your self. The
self-model is therefore nothing but an inner model as
the integrated and summarised version of your own
brain and body’s information processing. The self is here
thus a mere model of the own body’s and brain’s pro-
cesses. The self, e.g., the self-model, consists then in
nothing but a special form of representation.
The original mental self, the self as mental substance
or entity, is here replaced by mere self-representation
with a self-model. This implies a shift from a metaphy-
sical discussion of the existence and reality of self to the
processes that underlie the representation of body and
brain as an inner model, e.g., as a self-model. Since such
representation is based on the coordination and integra-
tion of the various ongoing processes in brain and body,
it is associated with specific higher-order cognitive
functions such as working memory, attention, executive
function, and memory amongst others (Figure 1a).
What does this imply for the characterization of the
self (presupposing a broader concept of self beyond the
self as mental substance)? The self is no longer charac-
terized as a mental substance but as a cognitive function.
Methodologically, this implies that the self is no longer
investigated in metaphysical terms with regard to its ex-
istence and reality. Instead, we need to search for the
cognitive processes underlying the special representation
implying empirical rather than metaphysical investiga-
tion. The question for the self is consequently no longer
an issue of philosophy but rather one of cognitive psych-
ology and ultimately of cognitive neuroscience. In short,
the self is no longer a metaphysical matter but subject of
empirical investigation.
Concept of self: phenomenal self
Descartes ‘located’ the self outside the experience itself.
His view of the self as mental substance is prior to and
ab
Figure 1 Concepts of self. a Mental self and its replacement by an
empirical self. b Phenomenal self as pre-reflective self-consciousness.
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the self prior to and thus outside the experience, can the
self make experience possible, e.g., consciousness. Ex-
perience and consciousness are thus presupposed by
something lying outside itself. This outside is a mental
substance as proposed by Descartes.
However, in phenomenological philosophy, such ‘out-
side’ location of the self is denied. Phenomenological
philosophy is interested in investigating the structure
and organisation of our experience and thus of cons-
ciousness. It focuses on how our experience is structured
and organized and reveals phenomenal features as we
experience them from the first-person perspective.
How does the phenomenal approach determine the
self? Currently, it is argued that the self is an integral
part of that very experience itself [3]. How can the self
be part of our experience? The self is not present in the
experience as distinct and separate content as is the case
with objects, events, or other persons. Instead, it is al-
ways already present and manifest in the phenomenal
features of our experience such as intentionality (e.g. the
directedness of our consciousness towards specific con-
tents), qualia (e.g., the qualitative character of our ex-
perience what it is like), etc. which without the self
would remain impossible. Consequently, phenomeno-
logical philosophers such as Zahavi [4] (2005) describe
as ‘pre-reflective self-consciousness’.
The concept of pre-reflective self-consciousness contains
two main terms, ‘pre-reflective’ and ‘self-consciousness’.Pre-reflective means here that the experience of the self
does not stem from any reflection or cognitive operation.
Instead it is already always there as part of our experience
such that we cannot avoid it. The self is thus pre-reflective.
It is simultaneously an inherent part of our experience and
thus of our consciousness. The self is consequently no lon-
ger outside of our consciousness but an integral part of it
hence the second term, self-consciousness. Such an ap-
proach suggests an intimate and even stronger intrinsic
linkage between self and consciousness (Figure 1b).
Characterizing the self in terms of self-consciousness
implies a significant shift. The self is no longer meta-
physical as in Descartes. Nor empirical as in Hume and
advocates such as Metzinger and Churchland. Instead,
the self is part of the experience and of consciousness
itself and can therefore be characterized as the ‘phenom-
enal self ’. Such a phenomenal self is thus open to sys-
tematic investigation of the phenomenal features of our
experience which would complement the metaphysical,
empirical, and logical approaches to the self.
Concept of self: minimal self
How can we describe the pre-reflective self-consciousness
in more detail? It is always already there in every experi-
ence so that we cannot avoid or separate it from the ex-
perience. The self is always present in our consciousness
and thus in our subjective experience. Even if we do not
focus on the self as such, we cannot avoid its presence.
Hence, the pre-reflective self-conscious describes an im-
plicit or tacit experience of our self in our consciousness.
Since the self as pre-reflectively experienced is the
basis of all phenomenal features of our experience, it
must be considered as basic and fundamental for any
subsequent cognitive activity. Such basic and fundamen-
tal self occurs in our experience before any reflection.
When for instance reading the lines of this book, you do
experience the contents and in addition to that you also
experience your self as reading these lines. Hence your
immediate experience, e.g., consciousness, does come
with both the content and your own self. Since the ex-
perience of such self occurs prior to any reflection and
recruitment of higher-order cognitive functions, such
self is sort of a minimal version of the self. Current phe-
nomenological philosophers such as Gallagher [5] or
Zahavi [4] speak therefore of a ‘minimal self ’ when refer-
ring to the self as implicitly, tacitly, and immediately ex-
perienced in consciousness.
How can we describe the concept of the ‘minimal
self ’? The minimal self describes a basic form of self that
is part of any experience. As such, it is not extended
across time as it is case in the experience of a continuity
of the self across time resulting in what is described as
personal identity. Instead the minimal self describes a
basic sense of self at any particular given moment in
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different moments in time and thus a continuity across
time.
How can such continuity across time be constituted?
Cognitive functions such as memories and autobio-
graphical memories in particular may be central here.
The self may then become more complex and one may
speak of a cognitive, extended or autobiographical self,
as, for instance, the Portuguese-American neuroscientist,
Damasio does (see [6,7]).
Another important feature of the minimal self is that
although we experience it, we may not be aware of it as
such nor able to reflect upon it in order to gain know-
ledge of it. We are, to put in technical terms, only
pre-reflectively aware of the minimal self but not yet
consciously, reflective aware of it as such. How can we
become reflectively aware of the minimal self? That is
possible when all different time moments are put to-
gether and, as philosophers say, represented as such.
For such representation cognitive functions are needed
which make possible the putting and linking together
the different time points. By that the own minimal self is
represented or reflected upon as minimal self – the
corresponding functions can thus be termed self-
representational functions as termed by Metzinger
and Churchland.
Finally, the minimal self may also occur prior to and
precede verbalization and thus linguistic expression. Ra-
ther than being tied to specific linguistic concepts as is
the case with more cognitive concepts of the self, the
minimal self must be considered pre-linguistic. It is an
experience, a sense of self, that can barely be put into
concepts. We can experience it as self but are not really
able to describe these experiences in terms of concepts
and thus in a linguistic way. Such minimal self is thus
pre-linguistic and pre-conceptual. It may therefore occur
predominantly in the unconscious mode rather than be-
coming conscious as such. The minimal self may thus be
the subjective component of what Freud described as
ego, the objective structure of our psyche. Future re-
search will be needed to show the exact organisation
and structure of the minimal self in order to reveal its
psychodynamic relevance (see for instance [8,9]).Concept of self: social self
How does the self interact with other selves? So far we
described the self by itself in an isolated and purely
intra-individual way. However, in daily live, the self is
not isolated from others but always already related to
other selves and thus inter- rather than intra-individual.
This raises the question for what is described as the
‘problem of other minds’ in philosophy or, more gener-
ally, the question for intersubjectivity.How do we come to and make the assumption of at-
tributing mental states and thus self and mind to other
people? Philosophy has long relied on what is called the
‘inference by analogy’. What is the ‘inference by ana-
logy’? The ‘inference of analogy’ goes like this. We ob-
serve another person A to show the behavior of type X.
And we know that in our own case the same behavior, e.
g. type X, goes along with the mental state type M. Since
our own behavior and the ones of the person A are
similar, i.e., behavior of type of X, we assume the other
person A to show the same mental state type M we
experience.
We thus infer from the analogy of behavior between
us and the other person and our own associated mental
states to the mental state of the latter. Hence, by indirect
inference and analogy via our own case, we claim to ob-
tain knowledge of the other person’s mental state. How
can we make such inference? Very simple. We may
make it on the basis of our own mental states and their
associated behavior. And what we do may also hold for
the other person who in the same attributes mental
states to us by inferring them from the comparison be-
tween our behavior they observe and their own mental
states.
Why do we make such inference? Because it seems to
be the most easiest and best way for us to explain the
others’ behavior. Only by assuming and inferring that
you show mental states, I can explain your behavior. In
other terms, your behavior of for instance taking the left
street rather than the right one must originate in some
kind of mental states that provides you with knowledge
about the direction I, who chose the right street, do ap-
parently not possess. The assumption of mental states
thus seems to be the best explanation for your behavior.
The ‘inference by analogy’ may thus be considered an in-
ference to the best possible explanation.
The inference by analogy describes intersubjectivity in
a very cognitive and ultimately linguistic way when at-
tributing mental states and a self to other persons. There
may though be a deeper level of intersubjectivity. We
also feel the other persons’ mental states as for instance
when sharing the emotional pain the spouse experiences
when her father died. Such sharing of feeling is de-
scribed as empathy and sheds the light on a deeper pre-
cognitive and pre-verbal dimension of intersubjectivity
as it has been emphasized in especially phenomeno-
logical philosophy (see for instance Zahavi [4] (2005)).
Both, empathy and the attribution of mental states to
another person are however slightly puzzling: despite
that the fact that we do not experience the other’s men-
tal states and consciousness, we nevertheless either share
them (as in empathy) or infer them (as in the inference
by analogy). We have no direct access to other persons’
experience of a self and its mental states in first-person
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and assume that they have a self. How is that possible?
This is the moment where we need to introduce yet
another perspective. There is the first-person perspective
that is tied to the self itself and its mental states, the ex-
perience or consciousness of objects, events, or persons
in the environment. And there is the third-person per-
spective that allows us to observe the objects, events, or
persons in the environment from the outside rather than
from the inside as in the experience in first-person per-
spective. The picture however is not complete yet. The
interaction between the different selves as well as the
second-person perspective as sandwiched between first-
and third-person perspective are missing here.
What is the Second-Person Perspective? The Second-
Person Perspective has initially been associated in phil-
osophy with the introspection of the own mental states.
Rather than actually experiencing the own mental states
in first-person perspective, the second-person perspec-
tive makes possible to reflect and introspect about the
own mental states. That is for instance the case when
we ask ourselves whether it is really true that I heard the
voice from another person speaking out there in the en-
vironment (see also Schilbach et al. [10] 2013).
The second-person perspective thus allows to put the
contents as experienced in first-person perspective into
a wider context, the context of the own self as it is re-
lated to the environment. In other terms, the second-
person perspective makes possible to situate and inte-
grate the purely intra-individual self with its first-person
perspective into a social context thereby transforming it
into an inter-individual self. One can thus say that the
concept of self is here determined in a social way so that
one can speak of a ‘social self ’ ([10,11]).
How can we define the concept of the social self? The
concept of the social self describes the linkage and inte-
gration of the self into the social context of other selves.
This shifts the focus from the experience or conscious-
ness in the first-person perspective of a sole self to the
various kinds of interactions between different selves as
associated with the second-person perspective. As we
already indicated there may be different kinds of social
interactions including pre-cognitive and more cognitive
ones.
Empirical account of self
We so far described the self in purely conceptual terms
as it is discussed in philosophy. This however leaves
open the empirical characterization of the self, more
specifically the exact mechanisms that give rise to what
we described as self in the different conceptual facets.
Obviously the brain is central making possible the con-
stitution of a self. How though can we investigate the
self empirically in neuroscience? This is the question forthe kind of methodological strategies that we can apply
to experimentally investigate the self and its relation to
the brain’s neuronal mechanisms.
Empirical account of self: methodological approaches to
the experimental investigation of the self
How can we investigate the self? In order to experi-
mentally address the self, we need some quantifiable and
objective measures that can be observed from a third-
person perspective as distinguished from subjective ex-
perience from the first-person perspective. How can we
obtain such measures? Psychologists focusing on mem-
ory observed that items related to the own person were
better remembered, e.g., recalled, than those unrelated
to the person (see [12]). For instance, living in Ottawa, I
recall much better the recent thunderstorm that wiped
away several houses locally than you do as the reader,
perhaps living in Germany, who just heard about it in
the news.
There is thus superiority in recall of those items and
stimuli that are related to one’s own self. This is des-
cribed as self-reference effect (SRE). The SRE has been
well validated in several psychological studies [12]. Most
interestingly, it has been shown to operate in different
domains. Not only in respect to memory but also in re-
lation to emotions, sensorimotor functions, faces, words,
etc. In all these different domains (see below for details),
stimuli related to one’s own self, e.g., self-specific stimuli,
show much better recall than those that are unrelated to
one’s own self, e.g., non-self-specific stimuli.
How is the SRE possible? Numerous investigations
(see, e.g., [13,14] for summaries) show that the SRE is
mediated by different psychological functions. These
range from personal, e.g., autobiographical memories
over memories of facts, e.g., semantic memories, to
those cognitive capacities that allow for self-reflection
and self-representation as introduced above, e.g., repre-
senting the processes in one’s own brain and body.
Hence, the SRE is by itself not a unitary function but ra-
ther a complex multifaceted psychological composite of
functions and processes.
How can we link the SRE to the brain? Before the
introduction of functional imaging techniques like fMRI
at the beginning of the 1990s, most studies conducted
focused on the effect of dysfunction or lesions in specific
brain regions by for instance brain tumors or stroke.
These revealed that, for instance, lesions in medial tem-
poral regions that are central in memory recall, such as
the hippocampus, change and ultimately abolish the SRE
effect.
With the introduction of brain imaging techniques
such as fMRI, we could then transfer the experimental
paradigms of comparing self- and non-self-specific sti-
muli to the scanner and investigate the underlying brain
Northoff Child and Adolescent Psychiatry and Mental Health 2013, 7:28 Page 6 of 12
http://www.capmh.com/content/7/1/28regions. The basic premise here is that if self-specific
stimuli are better recalled than non-self-specific ones,
they must be processed in the brain in a different way
such as, for instance, by higher degrees of neural activity
and/or different regions.
This led to the investigation of numerous experimental
designs of SRE-like paradigms in the fMRI scanner. For
example, subjects were presented trait adjectives that
were either related to themselves (such as for me, my
hometown, Ottawa) as opposed to (Sydney, an unrelated
city for me). Or the participant’s own face was presented
and compared with faces of other people. Also autobio-
graphical events from the subject’s past were compared
with those from other people. One’s own movements
and actions could also be compared with those of other
people implying what is called ownership (e.g., my move-
ments) and agency (“I my self caused that action’).
As can be seen, the stimuli belonged to different do-
mains such as memory, faces, emotions, verbal, spatial,
motor, or social. Most of the stimuli were presented
either visually or auditorily. Also the presentation of
these stimuli was most often accompanied by an on-line
judgment about whether the stimuli are related, e.g., per-
sonally meaningful, or not to the respective subject.
Empirical account of self: spatial patterns of neural
activity during self-reference
What results did the various imaging studies yield in
fMRI? Two different kinds of regions showed. First, one
could see that the regions specific for the respective do-
main like emotions or faces were recruited. For instance,
there is a region in the back of the brain that processes
specifically faces (as distinguished from say houses), this
is called the fusiform face area. This region is obviously
active during the presentation of faces no matter whe-
ther it is one’s own face or another person’s face. Import-
antly, clear differences between self- and non-self-specific
stimuli could not be observed in these domain-specific re-
gions in most of the studies (see [12]).
What about other regions that are not specific for a
particular domain like emotions or faces, e.g., domain-
independent regions are involved in the neural process-
ing of the self? ? Meta-analyses of the various studies
demonstrated the involvement of a particular set of
regions in the middle of the brain. These regions in-
clude the perigenual anterior cingulate cortex (PACC),
the ventro- and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC,
DMPFC), the supragenual anterior cingulate cortex
(SACC), the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) and the
precuneus. Since they are all located in the midline of
the brain, they have been coined ‘cortical midline struc-
tures’ (CMS).
The self-specific stimuli, e.g., those that were perso-
nally relevant for the subjects, induced higher neuralactivity in these regions than non-self-specific ones, e.g.,
those that remained irrelevant und unrelated to the
person. This was observed in the various domains for
faces, trait adjectives, movements/actions, memories,
and social communication. The CMS thus seem to show
a special significance to the self, e.g., self-reference
(Figure 2).
There is some differentiation within the CMS though.
The self-specific stimuli may be presented in different
ways to the subject in the scanner. If subjects have to
make judgments requiring cognitive involvement, the
dorsal and posterior regions like the SACC, DMPFC and
PCC are recruited to a stronger degree. If, in contrast,
stimuli are merely perceived without any judgment and
thus cognitive component, the ventral and anterior re-
gions like the VMPFC and PACC were strongly involved.
This led to the assumption that the different regions
mediate different aspects of self-reference. The ventral
and anterior regions such as the PACC and VMPFC may
be more involved in the representation of the stimulus’
degree of self-reference. However, dorsal regions such as
the SACC and the DMPFC may be related to monitoring
and reflection of the stimulus and its self-reference when
we become aware of the stimulus as self-specific. Finally,
the posterior regions like the PCC may be implicated in
integrating the stimulus and its degree of self-reference
into the autobiographical memory of the respective per-
son. These regions have been shown to be implicated in
the recall and retrieval of especially personally relevant
and thus autobiographical information from the past of
that person.
In sum, specific regions in the midline of the brain,
the cortical midline structures, seem to be involved in
the neural processing of self-reference, e.g., attributing
personal relevance or self-relevance to stimuli.
Empirical account of self: temporal patterns of neural
activity during self-reference
In addition to the spatial patterns of self-reference, its
temporal patterns have also been investigated using
electroencephalogram (EEG) for the measurement of
electrical activity in the brain. Again self- and non-self-
specific stimuli have been compared with each other
while the subjects undergo EEG measurement. This re-
vealed early changes during self-specific stimuli at
around 100-150 ms after stimulus onset, e.g., the begin-
ning of the stimulus.
Self-specific stimuli induce earlier temporal changes at
130-200 ms after the beginning of the stimulus than
non-self-specific changes in the brain’s electrical activity.
Moreover, self-specific stimuli induce later changes at
around 300-500 ms. Hence, the temporal pattern be-
tween self- and non-self-specific stimuli shows early and
late differences. Neural activity is variable and oscillates.
Figure 2 Cortical midline structures and the self. a Distinction between self and non-self: cortical midline structures and domain
indepedence. b Cortical midline structures-anatomical definition.
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One such frequency range of the Gamma frequency
occurring in a range of 30-40 Hz. Some studies now ob-
served that self-specific stimuli induce stronger oscilla-
tions in the Gamma frequency, e.g., stronger power, than
non-self-specific stimuli which occurred especially in the
midline regions. However, functions other than self-
specificity like sensorimotor functions or cognitive
functions like attention or working memory also go
along with higher increases in the Gamma frequency
range which therefore may be considered unspecific
to the self.Empirical account of self: social patterns of neural activity
during self-reference
How can we investigate the earlier described social na-
ture of the self? Various studies have been conducted to
investigate different kinds of interaction between diffe-
rent selves. Pfeiffer et al. [11] (2013) and Schilbach et al.
(2013) [10] distinguish two different methodological ap-
proaches. One can investigate social cognition, the cogni-
tion of other people’s mind, from the outside and thus
from an observer’s point of view. Social cognition is here
investigated in an “offline” mode. More recently such
“offline” methodological strategy has been complemented
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ger investigated from the “outside” but rather from the
“inside” by taking the perspective or point of view of the
interacting selves themselves (rather than the observer’s
point of view).
Besides conducting several studies, the same group
now recently investigated the neural overlap between
emotional processing, resting state activity, and social-
cognitive processing (Schilbach et al. [15] 2012). They
conducted a meta-analysis including imaging studies
from all three kinds of investigations, resting state, emo-
tional, and social-cognitive. In a first step they analysed
the regions implicated in each of the three tasks. This
yielded significant recruitment of neural activity in espe-
cially the midline regions like the ventro and dorso-
medial prefrontal cortex and the posterior cingulate
cortex (bordering to the precuneus). In addition, neural
activity in the temporo-parietal junction and the middle
temporal gyrus was observed.
In a second step they overlaid the three tasks, emo-
tional, social-cognitive, and resting state, in order to
detect commonly underlying areas. This indeed re-
vealed the midline regions, the dorsomedial prefrontal
cortex and the posterior cingulate cortex, to be com-
monly shared among emotional and social-cognitive
tasks and the resting state activity. Based on this
neural overlap the authors conclude that there may
be an intrinsically social dimension in our neural ac-
tivity which may be essential for any subsequent con-
sciousness of both our own self and other selves. If
this holds, it will have rather radical consequences
not only for the concept of the self but for conscious-
ness in general as we will indicate at the very end of
this paper.Neurophilosophical reflection
How can we now link the empirical data about self-
reference from neuroscience to the conceptual determi-
nations of the self in philosophy? One way is to directly
infer the concept of self from the empirical data as it is
for instance suggested by the earlier described propo-
nents of an empirical self. That however is to neglect
that empirical and conceptual domains do not need to
correspond one-to-one. Instead, the conceptual domain
and its definition of the self may go beyond the data in
the empirical domain (or vice versa). Due to such
possible difference between empirical and conceptual
domains we need to investigate the degree of corres-
pondence or matching between empirical data and
conceptual definitions of the self. In other words, we
must investigate the empirical plausibility of the con-
ceptual definitions in order to yield a truly neurophi-
losophical concept of self.Neurophilosophical reflection: Psychological and
experimental specificity
How can we directly compare empirical data and con-
ceptual definitions? Before making their direct compa-
rison, we need to be clear about the empirical data
themselves. What exactly can they tell us about the self?
This touches upon the question how specific the
obtained data are for the self as distinguished from other
psychological and mental features. In other words, we
have to check for the specificity of the data which may
take on different forms.
Most of the FMRI and EEG studies above compared
self- versus non-self-specific stimuli, such as a grand
piano for a professional pianist compared to a saw for a
carpenter. In addition to the mere perception, subjects
were required to make a judgment after each stimulus,
to judge whether it was self- or non-self-specific. This
raises the question about what the study is measuring -
the perception or the judgment of the stimulus? Is it
thus capturing the effect of the stimulus itself or the task
related to that stimulus?
Most likely the results reflect a mixture between
stimulus- and task-related effects. This therefore sheds
some doubt on whether the midline regions show psy-
chological specificity for the self. The judgment about
self-specificity requires various cognitive functions such
as attention, working memory, and autobiographical
memory retrieval. Some authors, such as the French
neuroscientist D. Legrand [16], therefore argued that the
midline regions may be more related to what she de-
scribes as ‘general evaluation function’, rather than being
specific to the self and self-specific stimuli.
What about when research investigates self in relation
to more basic functions such as movements and actions?
Even when subjects perform some motor tasks, we face
the same confusion of different functions: The self com-
ponents such as ownership, e.g., is the movement my
own movement, as well as agency, e.g., whether I am the
agent of that very movement, may be confounded by the
neural mechanisms underlying the execution of the
movement/action by the person.
Such psychological unspecificity highlights the need in
neuroscience to specify the experimental design and
measures. We need measures that are specific to the self
as distinguished from the various associated sensori-
motor, affective, and cognitive functions. And we need
experimental designs to segregate stimulus- and task-
related effects, for example, by spacing perception and
judgment temporally apart from each other.
Neurophilosophical reflection: Self-specificity and other
functions
Finally, one needs to discuss the relationship between self
and other functions. Recent imaging studies demonstrated
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emotions, and self and decision making. For example,
when receiving a reward in relation to a specific stimuli,
such as money, regions of the reward system like the ven-
tral striatum (VS) and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(VMPFC) become active [17]. These same regions are also
very active when the same stimulus is conceived as self-
specific rather than non-self-specific by the respective
subject. The same effects can be observed in emotions
where emotional and self-specific stimuli have been shown
to overlap in especially the anterior midline regions,
such as the perigenual anterior cingulate cortex and
the VMPFC.
Finally, the same can be observed in decision making:
If external cues are provided when making a decision
(such as a higher or lower price of the same kind of
apples), lateral cortical regions become active. If, in con-
trast, no such external cues are provided, we need to
come up with some internal criterion to guide and make
our decision about which to purchase [18]. Such internal
criterion can only stem from our self. Studies comparing
both kinds of decision making showed predominant in-
volvement of the midline regions in internally-guided
when compared to externally-guided decision making
[18].
Together such neural overlap between self and other
functions such as reward, emotions, and decision ma-
king raises questions about the relationship between
them. Different models could be imagined. Self- and
self-specificity could be an independent function just like
attention, working memory, emotion, sensorimotor, etc.
However, in that case, one would expect specific regions
in the brain and specific psychological functions to sub-
serve specifically and exclusively self-specificity. This
though at this point in time, cannot be supported
empirically.
Finally, one could also suggest that self and self-
specificity are basic functions that underlie and provide
the basis for all other functions, e.g., sensorimotor, af-
fective, cognitive, social. In this sense, self and self-
specificity would occur prior to the recruitment of the
other functions. Self-specificity would then always be
there making its involvement and manifestation in the
various functions unavoidable. Rather than searching for
self-specificity in relation to specific cognitive functions
such as language, one would then need to look for more
basic functions that must occur prior to the other ones.
Self-specificity in that sense may then also be linked to
psychodynamically relevant mechanisms like defense
mechanisms that then may describe the structuring and
organising of the content in relation to the respective
self. Hence, self-specificity may then be put into psycho-
dynamic context in order to better understand its struc-
ture and organisation and its mechanisms of operationas presumably manifest in defense mechanisms (see [8]).
Thereby one may assume neuronally the interplay bet-
ween subcortical and cortical midline structures to be
central which though remains to be researched in detail
(see [8,9]).
Neurophilosophical reflection: Phenomenal specificity of
the self
To recap, the minimal self describes a basic sense of self
that occurs immediately and is always already part of
our experience of the world. The question now is how
the concept of the minimal self is related to the neuro-
scientific results discussed above. For that we briefly
have to shed a light on the experience of the minimal
self as manifest in pre-reflective self-consciousness.
Consciousness can be characterized by various phe-
nomenal features like qualia and first-person perspective.
In short, qualia describes the point of view and its what
it is like of our experience. All your experience presup-
pose a specific point of view, your individual one, that is
different from the one of other persons. This individually
specific point of view is supposed to give your experi-
ence a specific quality, qualia. The first-person perspec-
tive refers to the fact that we can experience the world
only from a first-person perspective while any experi-
ence remains impossible from a third-person perspective
where we can only observe but not experience.
If the self, e.g., the minimal self, is part of any experi-
ence (rather than being outside of it), the self should be
manifest in these phenomenal features too. One may
therefore consecutively speak of self-qualia or first-
person giveness of the self as phenomenological authors
[4,5] do. What experiential and thus phenomenal fea-
tures does the self add?
Phenomenological philosophers assume that the spe-
cial contribution of the self consists in what they
describe as ‘belongingness’ or ‘mineness’ [4,5]: The con-
tents of our experience are experienced as belonging to
a particular self, they are experienced as mine. For in-
stance, I experience the laptop on which I write here in
front of me as my laptop going along with an experience
of mineness or belongingness. However, such experience
is not possible for the person sitting besides me who
though looking at the same laptop does not experience
any mineness or belongingness. Instead, he may experi-
ence mineness or belongingness of the CD lying besides
the laptop because he is a composer and it is a CD of
his work.
Such mineness or belongingness are particularly im-
portant when relating to specific contents which make
up our unconscious. Even unconscious contents may in-
duce mineness and belongingness the degree of which
may then signal how much they will occupy the uncon-
scious and be relevant in future thoughts and behaviour.
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ness provide a real bridge to mechanisms discusses in
psychoanalysis and, more specifically, defense mecha-
nisms. Defense mechanisms may be particularly strongly
recruited in case of unconscious contents with a high
degree of mineness and belongingness while they may
not be set in motion if the relevance is low. In short, the
concepts of mineness and belongingness may be psycho-
dynamically highly relevant.
Neurophilosophical conclusion
What do these considerations tell us about the self? We
here could not conduct a full-blown neurophilosophical
investigation of the self which is beyond the scope of this
paper. What however we were able to do is to show
what information the empirical data contain about the
self when discussing the issue of the various forms of
specificity. What kind of self shall now we opt for?
Which of the various concepts of self as discussed in
philosophy is empirically plausible? We will not be able
to reach a neurophilosophical conclusion but can only
indicate a couple of points that may be important for fu-
ture neurophilosophical investigation.
Neurophilosophical conclusion: Phenomenal specificity
and phenomenal limits
In order to account for phenomenal specificity, neuro-
science needs to show the neuronal mechanisms under-
lying the experience of mineness and belongingness and
also to distinguish those neuronal mechanisms under-
lying the other phenomenal features of experience,
intentionality, unity, first-person perspective, qualia, and
spatiotemporal continuity. One would therefore require
distinct experimental measures and designs for each of
these phenomenal features. Only then would we be able
to achieve phenomenal specificity and to clearly distin-
guish the phenomenal or minimal self from phenomenal
consciousness. In short, we need to experimentally dis-
tinguish between self- and non-self-specific phenomenal
measures.
However, the phenomenological philosopher may want
to raise the following question: Is such phenomenal spe-
cificity with the experimental distinction between self
and non-self-specific phenomenal measures really pos-
sible at all? The minimal self is considered part of the
experience and thus of consciousness in general. Any
consciousness of the world goes along with an experi-
ence of the self in a pre-reflective way. And the converse
holds too. Any experience of the self is part of an experi-
ence of the world. Both experience of self and experi-
ence of world are thus intrinsically linked.
What does such an intrinsic link between experience
of self and experience of the world imply for the phe-
nomenal specificity of the self? It means that we willremain unable to properly and clearly segregate experi-
mental measures for the minimal self from those of our
experience in general, e.g., experience of the world.
More specifically, this means that we will be unable to
account experimentally for mineness and belongingness
distinct and separate from other spatiotemporal features
such as spatiotemporal continuity, unity, first-person
perspective, and qualia.
Why? Because these phenomenal features are always
already ‘infected’ by the self, e.g., mineness and belo-
ngingness, in the same way as they are encoded and
ingrained into the self.. Hence, the requirement of max-
imal experimental and phenomenal specificity may here
have reached its phenomenal limits. If so, we may be
forced to acknowledge that there may be principal limi-
tations in what we can and cannot investigate experi-
mentally when it comes to the minimal self.Neurophilosophical conclusion: Minimal self and body
How about self and body? We can experience our own
body as our own body. This leads us to the characteristic
feature of the body, namely, that it can be experienced
by itself in consciousness. The body is not only an ob-
jective body that can be observed from a third-person
perspective. This is the body the neuroscientist and the
doctor investigate. It can also be experienced from a
first-person perspective. This is the body we experience
in consciousness which is therefore characterized as a
‘lived body’.
The ‘lived body’ is the body which we experience as
our body, as my body as distinguished from others’ bo-
dies. Hence, we experience the lived body in terms of
mineness and belongingness. Thus, the experience of the
body, the lived body, may be regarded as the first and
most fundamental manifestation of the phenomenal or
minimal self. Our self in its most basic and minimal
form is thus essentially a bodily self.
Such mineness and belongingness is also reflected in
what we described earlier as ownership and agency.
Ownership describes that I experience my body as my
body rather than some other body. Neuroscientifically,
the ownership of the body has been associated with
neuronal activity in specific regions of the brain such as
the sensory cortex and the parietal cortex with the par-
ietal cortex mediating the spatial position of the body in
the world.
Agency is the experience that I rather than some other
person originated and caused the subsequent action and
movement. I, e.g., my self, am the agent of the lines I am
currently writing here on my laptop. The action and the
movements are thus mine since they were caused by me
as agent. Neurally, regions such as the premotor cortex
and the motor cortex have been associated with agency;
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ment and action in general.
Neurophilosophical conclusion: Self as brain-based
neurosocial structure and organization
What does this imply for the self? Our self may be con-
sidered as intrinsically to the body thus being embodied.
Furthermore, since it is based on self-reference as the at-
tribution of personal relevance to environment (and
bodily stimuli), our self may also be intrinsically linked
to the environment thus being embedded and social.
Our self can consequently not be regarded an entity lo-
cated somewhere in the brain and isolated from both
body and environment. Instead our self seems to be in-
trinsically social as suggested by the advocates of the
concept of a social self (see earlier).
What does such intrinsically bodily and social nature
imply for the conceptual characterization of the self?
Our self may be described as structure and organisation
rather than as entity be it mental or physical. Such struc-
ture and organisation needs to develop through child-
hood and adolescence with persistent changes even
throughout adulthood. Despite all the changes there
may be persistence and continuity across time which
then accounts for what can be described as identity.
Identity may describe the persistence and continuity of
self over time which, in an exploratory study, has re-
cently been associated with the midline structures and
their high intrinsic activity (see [19]).
We can also see that such concept of self as structure
and organisation is embodied, e.g., intrinsically linked to
the body, and embedded, e.g., intrinsically linked to the
environment. Hence, the virtual structure of the self
spans across brain, body, and environment with the
brain’s midline structure activity being a neural pre-
disposition for its constitution, while at the same time
being dependent upon the respective environmental
context. Freud’s characterization of the ego as structure
and organisation thus surfaces here in a more specific
embodied and embedded gestalt as intrinsically rela-
tional or biopychosocial. Future investigation may now
link the different features Freud attributed to the ego to
the self as understood here and the above described
mechanisms (see [8,9]).
What however do we mean exactly by the concepts of
structure and organization? The structure must be vir-
tual in that it spans across the physical boundaries of
brain, body, and environment. Does this mean that we
have to revert to a mental structure and organization as
distinct from the physical structure and organization of
the brain? No! The results from neuroscience clearly link
the self with neuronal processes related to both in-
traindividual experiences and interindividual interaction.
There is thus a neuronal basis for the distinct aspects ofthe self within the context of brain, body, and environ-
ment. We therefore reject the mental characterization of
the structure and organization that is supposed to define
the self.
How can we define the concepts of structure and
organization in a more positive way? One way is to cha-
racterize structure and organization as social as dis-
tinguished from both mental and physical. The social
characterization would then be an intermediate or better
commonly underlying basis between the purely physical
and the purely mental. The self is then based on the
brain but extends beyond it to body and environment.
This means that conceptually, we need to characterized
the concept of the self as brain-based rather than brain-
reductive (as the proponents of the empirical self tend
to do). Such brain-based nature of the self also excludes
both mind-and consciousness-based approaches to the
self as advocated by the earlier philosophical approaches
in their concepts of a mental self and a phenomenal self.
If the social characterization of the structure and
organization as related to the self is indeed as basic and
fundamental, one would assume that our brain’s neural
activity is intrinsically social [15] that is neurosocial by
default: the brain cannot avoid including the social en-
vironmental context in the encoding of stimuli into its
own neural activity which then is by default neurosocial
rather than purely neuronal [20]. This is supported by
the earlier described neural overlap between resting state
activity and the neural activity changes during emotional
and social-cognitive tasks.
Whether the brain encodes its neural activity indeed
in an intrinsically neurosocial way remains however un-
clear at this point. What is clear though is that the exact
characterization of the brain’s neural activity will be es-
sential to develop a truly neurophilosophical (rather than
philosophical or neurocientific) and thus brain-based
(rather than brain-reductive) and neurosocial (rather
than merely neuronal) concept of the self.
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